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Abstract—The cloud based delivery model for IT resources is 
revolutionizing the IT industry. Despite the marketing hype 
around “the cloud”, the paradigm itself is in a critical transition 
state from the laboratories to mass market. Many technical and 
business aspects of cloud computing need to mature before it is 
widely adopted for corporate use. For example, the inability to 
seamlessly burst between internal cloud and external cloud 
platforms, termed cloud bursting, is a significant shortcoming of 
current cloud solutions. Furthermore, the absence of a capability 
that would allow to broker between multiple cloud providers or 
to aggregate them into a composite service inhibits the free and 
open competition that would help the market mature. This paper 
describes the concepts of cloud bursting and cloud brokerage and 
discusses the open management and security issues associated 
with the two models. It also presents a possible architectural 
framework capable of powering the brokerage based cloud 
services that is currently being developed in the scope of 
OPTIMIS, an EU FP7 project.  
 
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Cloud Brokering, Cloud 
Federation, Cloud Bursting 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
LOUD computing has emerged as one of the most 
promising and challenging technologies of our time. This 
new paradigm utilises two separate technological 
development—utility computing and service oriented 
architecture—to provide the users (individuals, SMEs and 
enterprises) with a highly scalable, pay-per-use,   everything-
as-a-service model for IT delivery. Some of the properties that 
characterise the cloud computing service delivery model are 
scalability/elasticity, on-demand service provisioning, shared 
resource pooling, multi-tenancy hosting, utility pay-as-you-use 
pricing and abstraction of lower layers [1]. These 
characteristics give rise to several business drivers that make 
cloud computing an attractive service delivery model from a 
customer’s point of view. They include capital expenditure 
reduction, increased IT agility, faster return on investment, 
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removal of barriers to entry as well as a more robust and 
resilient infrastructure leading up to better business continuity.  
 
From a deployment model point of view, a cloud computing 
taxonomy can be divided into the following types: 
 
Public clouds: where the IT capabilities that are offered by 
cloud providers to any customers over the internet. 
 
Private clouds: where IT capability is offered to a select group 
of consumers who are part of an enterprise. The cloud service 
provider may be an internal IT organisation (i.e., the same 
organisation as the consumer) or a third party. 
 
Hybrid clouds: in which the environment is created through 
the usage of a combination of private and public cloud 
offerings by an organisation. 
 
Internal clouds: is a subset of the private cloud model, where 
the cloud is an IT capability offered as a service by an IT 
organisation to its own business. 
External clouds: is IT capability offered as a service to a 
business that is not hosted by its own IT organisation. An 
external cloud can be public or private, but must be 
implemented by a third party. 
From a point of view of architectural service layers based on 
the services provided using the cloud model, the ecosystem 
can be broadly divided into three: 
 
Software as a Service (SaaS): forms the top layer featuring a 
complete application provided in a multi-tenant environment. 
One prominent example of SaaS is Salesforce [2]. 
 
Platform as a Service (PaaS): providing a development and 
deployment middleware layer. Key players include the 
Microsoft Azure platform [3] as well as Google App Engine 
[4]. 
 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): the lowest layer delivering 
services like compute storage and network. One prominent 
example of IaaS is Amazon EC2 service [5]. The work 
reported here mainly deals with the IaaS service delivery 
model. 
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 While a lot has been said about the cost benefits of moving 
into a cloud-based delivery model for IT resources as well as 
the technical merit of using a multi-tenanted cloud 
infrastructure, there has so far been a lack of enterprise-level 
uptake at a large scale.  Privacy and security concerns are 
widely considered as major obstacles for cloud adoption by 
corporations and governments at large [6]. The widely 
publicised security issues associated with the cloud are major 
challenges that need to be addressed before wider adoption 
from enterprises can be expected. Some of the security issues 
that concern a generic cloud service offering include: 
 Privacy of data: It has always been a sensitive topic as far 
as IT services are concerned. The complexity of the 
problem is compounded in the cloud services due to their 
unique operational model involving multi-tenanted 
architecture that makes extensive use of shared resources. 
 Confidentiality and integrity of data: while cloud provider 
aims to provide data confidentiality and integrity, they do 
not offer any actionable guarantee regarding this and leak 
of non-encrypted data remains a big risk. 
 Integration with existing infrastructure: even when an 
enterprise moves its IT services to the cloud, in effect de-
perimeterising its infrastructure, it still needs to integrate 
these services with the rest of the existing IT 
infrastructure. An improperly integrated Identity and 
Access Management (IdAM) system can present practical 
difficulties during the implementation stage. 
 Platform vulnerabilities: the potential threat/attack surface 
exposed by a cloud service depends on the delivery model 
of the provider. SaaS offerings’ potential breach area are 
more concentrated on the actual application security 
issues (like database security, message-level security) and 
operational issues (like accounts management, user rights 
managements). PaaS services inherit most of the SaaS 
attack vectors in addition to having specific ones like 
Web Service security and value-adding platform services 
security. A IaaS service exposes a plethora of attacks 
vectors that range from the non-unique application, 
database and message-level security to infrastructure 
specific issues like virtual machine management, 
operating system hardening, virtual machine security etc 
 
 While security issues do present a clear hurdle for wider 
adoption of cloud services, equally inhibiting the adoption of 
cloud computing is the lack of maturity of the delivery and 
operational models for cloud based services. 
 
This paper looks at some of the work done in rectifying these 
shortcomings as a part of the OPTIMIS [7,8] project. The rest 
of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the 
motivation behind the OPTIMIS project. Section 3 describes 
the cloud bursting model and the main capability requirements 
associated with it while Section 4 describes the various models 
that form the cloud brokerage service model. Section 5 
proposes a functional architecture that implements the model 
identified in the previous section. Section 6 and 7 looks at the 
specific case of use of such a broker based cloud service 
model for both storage and compute services. Section 8 
concludes the paper with future directions for this work. 
II. MOTIVATION 
As recognized in previous literature [9], cloud technologies 
and models have yet to reach their full potential and many of 
the capabilities have not yet been developed and researched to 
a level that allows their exploitation to a full degree. For 
example, there is currently a lack of efficient automation of 
the processes underpinning the management of internal clouds 
and interaction between public-private clouds. 
The EU FP7OPTIMIS [7] project aims to rectify this situation 
by tackling the issue of optimisation over the whole cloud 
service life-cycle to enable a cloud ecosystem where both the 
internal clouds and cloud customer-provider relationships are 
managed optimally by incorporating economical and 
ecological sustainability, risk and trust. The high-level 
objective of the OPTIMIS project is to enable as open, 
scalable, dependable and virtualized cloud service ecosystem 
that will improve the delivery of adaptable, reliable, self-
service, secure, elastic, auditable, and sustainable IT services. 
The overall aim is to allow organizations to automatically and 
seamlessly externalize services and applications into 
trustworthy and auditable cloud services. 
The OPTIMIS project aims to offer functionality substantially 
beyond that of current cloud infrastructures. Contemporary 
solutions, both research projects and commercial products, 
have focused on providing functionalities at levels closer to 
the infrastructure, e.g., improved performance for 
virtualization of all, compute, storage, and network resources, 
as well as necessary raw functionality such as virtual machine 
migrations and server consolidation [10]. However such focus 
provides solutions that address only partial problems such as 
packaging a software stack in a virtual machine image. In 
order to move from a basic cloud service infrastructure to an 
improved cloud service ecosystem, there is a great need for 
supporting higher-level concerns in a comprehensive manner. 
OPTIMIS aims to enable the cloud service eco-system by 
developing open, scalable and dependable service platforms 
and architectures that allow flexible and dynamic provision of 
advanced services. 
The advancements towards an open cloud service ecosystem 
targeted by OPTIMIS are best explained by means of use case 
scenarios that showcase selected capabilities that are being 
developed by the OPTIMIS consortium in a likely commercial 
context.  
This paper focuses on the security of the cloud bursting and 
cloud brokerage / aggregation use-cases. Related issues of 
how the heterogeneity of the difference cloud environments 
can be abstracted away using a combination of commonly 
agreed upon APIs as well as a higher level programming 
environment that the application developers can develop 
against, thought important, is not discussed in this paper. 
Similarly, a use case focusing on cloud-based application 
development, though part of OPTIMIS, falls out of the scope 
of this paper.  
III. CLOUD BURSTING 
Consider the case of a company owning their own cloud 
infrastructure, a private cloud and willing to use resources 
from an external cloud provider, for certain time intervals and 
given certain circumstances triggering this use. Such a 
 capability, termed cloud bursting, would enable the 
organization to scale out their infrastructures and rent the 
resources from a third-party provider if and when needed, in a 
seamless manner. The renting of the external resources 
exponentially improves the elasticity of the company’s IT 
infrastructure and allows them to confront the fluctuations on 
demand dynamically. In this section we look into the salient 
features and requirements for implementing a cloud bursting 
capability. 
In order for the cloud bursting mechanism to work, the 
internal cloud of the company has to provide mechanisms to 
detect and determine their own-status: this is, to verify to what 
degree the provisioned services fulfil the established service 
level agreements (SLAs) and auxiliary requirements like 
energy consumption.  
In addition to this, the private cloud’s management mechanism 
also has to determine the nature of the services running in the 
internal cloud – its criticality, data privacy concerns, 
regulatory compliance issues and other requirements or 
constraints that have to be considered before migrating 
services and data to an external cloud provider.  In order to 
benefit from speed, agility and economies of scale, this 
decision making step has to be driven by a set of policies. 
Such policies could identify, for example, that a particular 
compute service uses a non-proprietary algorithm and only 
process public or non-sensitive data is a suitable candidate for 
bursting to a public cloud when the internal cloud environment 
is constrained. In the presence of an optimised cloud bursting 
infrastructure, such activities should be completed with the 
minimum cost for the private cloud owner. However, it can 
also be the case that due to regulatory constraints, for 
example, the services running on the private cloud 
infrastructure are not allowed to migrate to a public cloud 
under any circumstance, regardless of the level of assurance 
that the public cloud provider may offer.    
The cloud bursting orchestration layer has to be able to make 
these decisions based on the various SLA requirements and 
metadata associated with the applications and the data used by 
them. The policy-based service management mechanism 
allows cloud infrastructure to scale out, selecting resources 
according to the customer’s requirements without human 
intervention. The internal cloud management system will be 
able to take such decisions both on the basis of service level, 
and of other non-functional properties such as security, cost, 
etc., that require synthesis of information from within and 
outside the internal cloud. An example could be to pro-
actively force the migration of non-critical services whose 
SLAs are being met, in order to assure that a critical service 
that cannot be migrated receives all resources it requires to 
fulfil its SLA. 
To ensure the desired functionality in a dynamic environment, 
it is necessary to implement several auxiliary management 
capabilities, in addition to security and Quality of Service 
(QoS) optimisation, including, for example, the correct 
management of license instances in the external cloud.  
In addition, the external cloud has to be able to satisfy the 
over-capacity needed by the internal cloud with very short 
advance warning and it should also be able to load-balance its 
workload in such a way as not to suffer unacceptable service 
deterioration to existing customers. The external cloud should 
also execute the workloads dynamically, billing the resources 
by usage.   
In order to provide a working cloud bursting environment, the 
architecture being developed by OPTIMIS makes use of the 
following capabilities, among others: 
 Common management and operational interface – Since 
the cloud ecosystem consists of multiple cloud providers, 
each with its own management and operational interfaces, 
it is required that intermediary services (like the broker 
introduced in the next section) manage the compatibility 
of providers of cloud infrastructure through the use of 
appropriate API adapters and a management layer and 
that the individual providers adhere to and conform to a 
set specifications  
 A set of monitoring tools for capacity needs deployed on 
each collaborating cloud that can also be used to measure 
SLA parameter readings. 
 A common agreed format to specify SLA requirements 
and capabilities. 
 Providers can be categorised and rated according to 
service offering parameters as well as non-functional 
aspects such as risk, trust, cost and carbon usage. 
 
IV. CLOUD BROKERAGE MODEL 
As a generic definition, a Cloud service broker creates a 
governed and secure cloud management platform to simplify 
the delivery of complex cloud services to cloud service 
customers. They enable customers to realize the full potential 
that a cloud provider has to offer by creating a trusted, 
governed and secured cloud management platform between 
the provider and the consumer of the cloud services. They also 
help enforce the correct IT policies and effectively handle 
SLAs between cloud providers and cloud service consumers.  
As such however, the term cloud service broker is a loosely 
defined one and is meant to serve the needs of several 
different models. 
 
Enterprise use of multiple cloud providers: in this model, 
an enterprise organisation makes use of services provided by 
various cloud providers to fulfil an internal process. The main 
benefit of using the broker in this scenario is its ability to 
integrate more than one provider. For examples the process 
could be a one-off marketing initiative that uses CRM data 
from a SaaS provider like Salesforce exposed through their 
API, data captured within internal systems and data stored in 
cloud storages like S3 [11] or databases like SimpleDB [12]. 
In addition, the enterprise also decides to use an IaaS service 
from Sun to perform the necessary processing of the gathered 
data. OPTIMIS examines the generic requirements of such a 
process composition from the enterprise’s view point and the 
necessary technical resources necessary to realise such an 
orchestration. It covers the broad range of topics from service 
development to VM management and placement.  
From the point of view of the cloud service providers, extra 
capabilities need to be exposed to enable the enterprise to 
fulfil all orchestration requirements. These include, among 
others, common requirements such as trust establishment, 
federated identity management, access management; Web 
 Service based API calls for managing and operating the 
resources etc.  
 
Brokering multiple providers to provide a SLA-based 
tiered pricing model: in this scenario, an enterprise 
approaches a cloud broker with a given set of functional and 
SLA-based requirements and the cloud broker then picks up 
the best match in terms of the functions as well as variables 
like pricing, SLA parameters and other non-functional 
requirements like compliance and certification capabilities. 
The cloud broker could provide just the broker service or it 
could use its middle-man status to provide seamless and 
federated identity management, access management, policy 
enforcement, and audit capabilities to the enterprise, as shown 
in the illustration below. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The Cloud Broker as an entity that broker between multiple cloud 
providers to provide an SLA-based tiered pricing model. 
 
Cloud aggregation ecosystem (CAE):  this scenario offers 
the potential to treat both IT and business functions as a series 
of interconnected cloud services. CAE offers a means to 
architect a Service Oriented Infrastructure (SOI) on the cloud 
that is built on the fusion of: (a) composition of loosely 
coupled services based on an evolution of Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) principles applied to services that reside 
on cloud platforms (b) distributed management of ICT 
resources applied on federations of cloud platforms and (c) a 
network resource management based on a federated 
Operational Support System (OSS) architecture built on top of 
an in-cloud Network as a Service (NaaS) offering.  
This scenario adds the capability to incrementally build new 
service offerings by mixing together reusable functions 
(common capabilities) provided by off the shelf components 
and 3rd party cloud platforms in a new offering.  More 
specifically, CAE refers to the federation of a set of distributed 
virtual hosting environments for the execution of an 
application, integrating value-adding services (VAS) with 
these hosting environments, and providing a single (logical) 
access point to this aggregation.  In the simplest form, the 
CAE can be thought of as an extension of the SLA-based 
brokerage model with the additional ability of the cloud 
provider to in turn use other cloud services to provide its 
offering. From the perspective of the application consumer, 
these federations are transparent and constitute an integral part 
of the service being offered. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  The conceptual layering of the various services provided by the cloud 
aggregation ecosystem model. 
V. SECURE CLOUD BROKER ARCHITECTURE 
Now that the various forms of cloud brokerage has been 
introduced and its salient features explained, in this section we 
propose an architecture that can be used to implement the 
broker model involving the brokering of multiple providers to 
provide a SLA-based tiered pricing model to the customers of 
the broker. 
From the discussion above the requirements of a cloud service 
broker can be stated as the ability to: 
 Ensure data confidentiality and integrity to service 
customers. 
 Effectively match the requirements of cloud 
consumer with the service provided by the provider. 
 Negotiate with service consumers over SLAs. 
 Maintain performance check on these SLA's and take 
actions against SLA violation. 
 Effectively deploy services provided by the cloud 
provider to the customer. 
 Manage the API so that provider doesn't learn 
anything about the identity of the service consumer. 
 Securely transfer customer's data to the cloud.  
 Enforce access control decisions uniformly across 
multiple clouds. 
 Scale resources during load and provide effective 
staging and pooling services. 
 Securely map identity and access management 
systems of the cloud provider and consumer.  
 Analyze and take appropriate actions against risks. 
 Handle cloud burst/spill-over situations effectively.  
The functional components needed by the broker to provide 
these broker capabilities are specified in Figure 3 below. 
The Cloud API is a mechanism through which consumers can 
interact with the cloud broker for performing cloud related 
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 actions including creating and managing cloud resources like 
compute and storage components. The Deployment Service 
unit handles the deployment of services which cloud provider 
offers to the service consumer. To exemplify, through this unit 
the broker requests the cloud provider to start a virtual 
machine which the consumer can use for compute purpose or 
to create a storage space for user’s data. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Functional components of a cloud service broker providing brokerage 
services between multiple cloud providers. 
 
The Staging/Pooling Service unit is to handle cloud burst and 
spill over situations.  Since Cloud services are offered on pay-
as-you-go basis, and are highly scalable, service consumers 
can demand extra resources and the broker need to ensure that 
a suitable cloud provider is in place to handle the request. The 
broker interacts with the respective cloud provider on which 
service consumer’s applications and data are currently residing 
in a proactive manner to demand more resources. In case the 
cloud provider cannot meet the demand for the extra 
resources, the staging and pooling unit will find out another 
suitable match from the pool of underlying cloud providers 
and request the resource. 
 
Identity and access management unit is a vital unit as it not 
only verifies its own employees but also keeps record of all 
the service consumers - required enterprise details, assigned 
cloud providers, type of service like storage or compute and 
classification criteria. The classification criteria is decided 
during the SLA negotiation phase between the broker and the 
consumer and based on it, broker grants access to the 
employees of the consumer enterprise. As will be seen later 
on, the enterprise’s cloud management entity forwards a 
storage or compute request to the broker on behalf of its 
employee along with the classification criteria. Identity and 
access management unit then generates a one-time token on 
the basis of assigned classification criteria.     
The SLA monitoring unit constantly monitors all the SLAs 
negotiated by the SLA management unit. It checks to see if 
there are any impending SLA violations and if any, to take the 
specified preventive measures. The Capability Management 
and Matching unit keeps tab of all the capabilities provided by 
the various providers like its delivery and deployment model, 
security mechanism, fee structure, IT functionalities and all 
other necessary details. Whenever a service consumer 
approaches the broker for cloud services, this unit matches the 
consumer’s functional and SLA requirements with the services 
each cloud provider offer and finds the most appropriate and 
suitable match. This unit is also referred by the staging and 
pooling unit during sudden spike in demand of storage space. 
The Audit Unit periodically audits broker’s platform as much 
as possible using capabilities provided by the cloud provider. 
Audit is performed to ascertain the validity and reliability of 
information and to provide an assessment of internal controls. 
Firewall blocks malicious traffic to and from the various 
components exposed by the interfaces of the cloud broker 
service. 
The Risk Management unit identifies, assess and prioritize 
risks on the basis of effects of events. It targets to minimize, 
monitor and control the probability of such unfortunate events. 
The strategies to manage the risks include avoiding the risks, 
reducing negative effect of risks and accepting some or all of 
the consequences of a particular risk. In addition to the 
firewall module, the Network/ Platform Security unit manages 
the overall security of the broker’s platform. Provisions and 
policies are adopted to prevent unauthorized access, misuse, 
modification or denial of network or network accessible 
resources. It provides a protection at the boundaries of the 
platform by keeping out intruders. Furthermore, the intrusion 
detection system which is a part of this unit focuses on 
protecting data from malware, virus, worms, or trojans. 
The Usage Monitoring unit monitors the usage of the services 
by the cloud consumer, and generates monthly bills for them. 
The SLA Management module controls all the SLAs in place 
between the broker and consumer. 
VI. STORAGE IN A BROKERED CLOUD MODEL 
Given the component architecture in the previous section, we 
now look at how some of these components work together in 
an operational view of the system. For this, we here describe 
the sequences of steps taken by the various parties involved in 
order to provide a cloud based storage service to an enterprise 
end user using a brokered cloud model. For the sake of 
simplifying the presentation, it is assumed that the SLA based 
negotiations has taken place and the cloud provider bas 
already been chosen by the broker based on the criteria. 
The main entities involved in the process are the end user 
within an enterprise, the enterprise system’s internal identity 
and access management services, the enterprise cloud system 
represented by the cloud portal, the external broker service 
and the third party cloud providers. 
First we look at the process, show in Figure 4 that is followed 
when the end user is in need of a cloud service in order to save 
data into the cloud. For ease of explanation, the data 
transmitted in the packets of a specific step is mentioned in 
brackets. 
 
Step 1 (user credentials and storage request) - User sends a 
storage request to Enterprise Cloud Portal with its user id and 
password to store data on the cloud. 
Step 2 (user id, password and storage request) - Cloud portal 
then sends the same request with user id and password to 
enterprise IAM. The IAM verifies the user through its identity 
 information and if user is authentic, it checks the type of 
request user has sent. If the enterprise IAM can verify that the 
user is legitimate, it grants access rights as per the access 
management / classification criteria, and if it cannot, then it 
responds in negative. 
A. Storage of data in a brokered storage service 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Steps involved in a user performing a data storage operation on a 
cloud service using a Broker. 
 
Step 3 (Authentication and authorization response) - After 
authenticating the user, IAM gives access rights to the user 
based on the type of request along with the classification 
criteria. If IAM authorizes the request, then the Enterprise 
Cloud Portal converts the identity and access rights to an 
external token containing the classification criteria and storage 
request sent by the user, encrypts it and forwards it to the 
Broker IAM.  If the response is in negative, cloud portal 
informs the user that it’s request has been denied. 
Step 4 (encrypted external token and storage request packet) – 
Cloud portal forwards external token along with the storage 
request packet to the broker IAM, which then decrypts the 
packet using the cloud portal’s public key. This verifies the 
integrity of the packet received from the cloud portal. On the 
basis of the decrypted packet, broker’s IAM module generates 
a one-time access token. This one-time access token will allow 
the user to get access to the cloud assigned to the respective 
enterprise.  Along with the token, the broker IAM issues a 
URI through which user can get access to broker’s API. 
Furthermore, broker encrypts both the one time access token 
and URI and sends it back to the enterprise cloud portal.  
Step 5 (Encrypted one time access token and URI packet) – 
After validating the packet coming from enterprise cloud 
portal, broker IAM sends encrypted one time access token and 
URI to cloud portal. Enterprise cloud portal decrypts it, using 
the private key of the broker and forwards it to the respective 
user. Presence of cloud portal keeps the identity of user 
anonymous to the broker. 
Step 6 (One time access token and URI) - Cloud portal 
forwards the decrypted one time access token and URI of the 
broker’s API to the user. 
Step 7 (URI, one time access token and data)- Using the URI 
sent by cloud portal, user access the broker’s API and sends to 
it the token and the storage data to be pushed on to the cloud. 
The broker’s API validates the user using the token (broker’s 
API internally checks the validity of the token with broker’s 
IAM). If the token is correct, broker’s API stores the data onto 
the cloud.  
Step 8 (Data) - Broker’s API verifies the user through the one-
time access token and pushes the data sent by the user onto the 
cloud. In this step, broker’s API only forwards the data to the 
cloud without any other information to prevent  the cloud 
provider from knowing anything about the identity of the 
enterprise. Cloud provider only knows that the data came from 
the broker.  
Step 9 (ID) – Cloud provider stores the data in a ―bucket‖ 
inside the cloud and gives the externalised information about 
the position of the data to the broker’s Capability Management 
and Matching (CMM) unit. This helps broker to generate 
retrieval data access token.   This type of information that the 
cloud provider passes on to the broker about the location of 
the data varies from cloud to cloud.  The cloud provider also 
encrypts the location information packets with its secret key 
before forwarding it to the broker.  
Step 10 (UID)-Broker maps the location information provided 
by the cloud provider with a unique identity. For example if 
broker receives location information from the cloud provider 
as (CL1, BK15), it then maps it to a unique id like (B1 15). 
This is done so as to abstract away the cloud provider specific 
service details. This internal mapping is kept within the 
broker’s database. The broker then forwards the UID to the 
user through Broker’s API as an acknowledgment. The user 
stores this UID and uses it for future retrieval request.   
 
One of the main advantages of this architecture is that none of 
the internal information of the enterprise is revealed at 
broker’s or cloud provider’s platform. At the same time, the 
cloud provider specific details are also abstracted away from 
the enterprise or the end user. 
B. Retrieval of data in a brokered storage service 
Now that the data has been stored at the cloud provider, this 
part explains how it can be retrieved by the user at a later stage 
using the broker service. 
Step 1 (user credentials, UID and retrieval request) - User 
forwards a retrieval request to Enterprise Cloud Portal with its 
user id, password and UID to retrieve data from the cloud.   
Step 2 and Step 3 is the same as the first architecture, UID is 
not provided to Enterprise IAM as it doesn’t have any 
information about it.  
Step 4 (encrypted external token, UID and retrieve request 
packet) – Enterprise cloud portal forwards the encrypted 
external token, UID and retrieve request packet to the broker. 
Broker decrypts the packet using cloud portal public key. On 
the basis of the UID and the retrieve request, the broker 
generates a one-time access token along with a URI. The 
broker forwards the encrypted packet of one time access token 
and the URI to the cloud portal. 
Step 5 (Encrypted one time access token and URI packet) – 
Enterprise cloud portal decrypts the packet and forwards the 
decrypted content to the user.  
 Step 6 (One time access token and URI) – Cloud portal 
forwards one time access token and URI of the broker’s API 
to the cloud. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Steps involved in a user performing a data retrieval operation on a 
cloud service using a Broker. 
 
Step 7 (URI and one time access token) – User access broker’s 
API using the URI sent by the cloud portal and feeds in the 
token. This token slightly differs from the token generated in 
storage request and the broker’s API internally checks the 
location of the data stored on the cloud. 
Step 8 (ID) – The broker internally translates the ID to the 
cloud provider specific format (CL1, BK15) and forwards the 
encrypted ID to the cloud provider. The cloud provider 
decrypts the ID using its secret key and sends the requested 
data to broker’s API. In addition, it informs the broker if all or 
parts of the stored data have been retrieved. 
Step 9.1 (Data) – Cloud provider retrieves the data stored in 
the cloud on the basis of the ID provided by the broker’s API 
and forwards it to the broker’s API. 
Step 9.2 (ID) – Cloud provider also informs the broker if the 
request was for just access of the data or deletion of all the 
data or part of the data. If all the data is removed from the 
cloud, the broker only sends the data to the user and if not, it 
sends the UID along with the data to the user. 
Step 10 (Data and UID) – Through broker’s API, the user 
receives the requested data and UID of the remaining data. 
 
VII. COMPUTE IN A BROKERED CLOUD MODEL 
Just as with the storage use case, when the enterprise user 
wishes to use a compute platform in the cloud by starting up a 
new virtual machine, the service broker plays an intermediary 
role, but unlike the storage case, the nature of the compute 
example necessitates the direction access of the cloud provider 
platform by the enterprise end use. There are several steps 
involved in starting up the compute environment as well as for 
the user to actually access the environment and eventually shut 
it down when there is no more use for the environment. These 
steps are described below. 
Step 1 (user credentials and compute request)- User forwards 
the compute request along with its  user id  and password to 
enterprise cloud portal. 
Step 2 (user id, password and compute request) – Enterprise 
cloud portal then sends this request, the user id and password 
to enterprise IAM. IAM authenticates the user on the basis of 
its user id and password. Furthermore, IAM checks that the 
user is entitled to and accordingly grants access permission to 
the user.   
A. Compute instance creation 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Steps involved in a user creating a compute environment on a IaaS 
cloud service through a Broker service. 
 
Step 3 (Authentication and authorization response) - On the 
basis of user’s identity, IAM verifies the user and checks the 
role the user is assigned to. After authenticating the user it 
gives access rights along with classification criteria. If IAM 
responds positively, cloud portal converts the packet received 
in step 2 to an external token and encrypts it together with the 
compute request and forwards it to the broker. If the response 
of IAM is a negative, cloud portal informs the user about the 
denial of request. 
Step 4 (encrypted external token and compute request packet)- 
Cloud portal forwards the encrypted external token and 
compute request packet to the broker, broker decrypts the 
packet using its public key. On the basis of the compute 
request, broker contacts cloud provider to start a virtual 
machine instance. 
Step 5 (encrypted request to launch virtual machine instance) – 
After validating that the packet came from genuine source, 
broker requests the chosen cloud provider to start a virtual 
machine instance. Step 6 (Encrypted ID, elastic IP address and 
key packet) - Cloud provider acts on the request of the broker 
and launches VM. Further, it replies back to the broker with 
encrypted packet containing ID (information about the 
location of the VM), dynamic IP address of the VM and key 
details using which the user can SSH into the VM.  
Step 7 (Encrypted UID, elastic IP address and key packet) – 
Broker decrypts the packet received from the cloud provider 
using its secret key. It then maps the ID with a UID in the 
same manner as in the storage architecture and forwards an 
encrypted packet containing UID, dynamic IP address of the 
VM and the access key, to the enterprise cloud portal. 
Step 8 (UID, elastic IP address and key) – Enterprise cloud 
portal decrypts the packet received from the broker using its 
private key. It then forwards the decrypted packet to the 
 respective user. 
Step 9 (IP address and key) – User stores the UID for future 
reference and with the help of dynamic IP address and key, it 
SSH to the virtual machine. Thus a connection is established 
between the virtual machine and the user. 
 
B. Compute instance shutdown 
Once the compute platform has been used by the enterprise 
user, it needs to be shutdown. The following steps help 
perform this action. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Steps involved in a user shutting down a compute environment on a 
IaaS cloud service through a Broker service. 
 
Step 1 (User credentials, UID, and VM shut down request): 
User sends the request to shut down the VM instance to the 
cloud portal, along with user id, password and the UID 
assigned by the broker. 
Step 2 and Step 3 works the same way mentioned in 
architecture 3, with the UID not being provided to Enterprise 
IAM as it doesn’t have any knowledge about it.  
Step 4 (encrypted packet of external token, UID and VM shut 
down request): Enterprise cloud portal informs the cloud 
broker to shut down the VM instance initiated with the 
respective UID. 
Step 5 (encrypted VM shut down request and ID packet): 
Broker decrypts the packet with its public key. After that 
broker checks using the translated UID, the identity of the 
cloud provider and the ID of the VM issued by the cloud 
provider it sends an encrypted packet containing ID and VM 
shut down request to the respective cloud provider. 
Step 6 (Acknowledgment) Cloud provider decrypts the packet 
using its secret key and on the basis of the ID it shuts down 
the VM. Further, it sends an acknowledgment to the broker 
with the timestamp. 
Step 7 (Acknowledgment): Broker informs cloud portal that 
VM instance has been shut down. 
Step 8 (Acknowledgment): Cloud portal informs the same to 
the user. 
 
These steps show how the architecture is able to let the cloud 
broker seamlessly mediate between the enterprise (and its 
user) and the cloud provider, while at the same time allowing 
the user to directly access the compute environment at the 
provider when it is required. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The cloud delivery model has been suggested as the 
panacea for complex as well as inflexible IT systems that can 
be ill afforded by small and large enterprises alike. However 
the lack of mature operational models like that of cloud 
bursting and cloud brokerage has meant that the cloud 
capabilities have not yet been developed and researched to a 
level that allows their exploitation to a full degree. This has 
contributed to a lack of uptake of the cloud computing model 
in all but the simplest of enterprise IT setups. In this paper we 
introduced the concepts of cloud bursting, cloud brokerage 
and cloud aggregation and identified the capability 
requirement of the entities. The cloud brokerage model was 
examined in further detail, identifying the steps necessary to 
provide an efficient cloud broker service in storage and 
compute use case scenarios. 
As future work we plan to implement the steps identified in 
this paper with the focus on the capability to perform the SLA 
and security requirements matching correctly between user 
requirements and what the cloud provider can provide. We 
also plan to provide a similar treatment to the cloud bursting 
and cloud aggregation models. 
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